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The Great American Job Machine
A remarkable feature of the current economic
expansion, the longest peacetime expansion on
recordin the United States, has been the large
decline in the civilian unemployment rate from
its postwar peak of 10.7 percent in December
1982 to 5.9 percent in September 1987 - the
lowest level in eight years. This decline is even
more remarkable when contrasted with the per-
formance of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation-Development (OECD) countries.
The weighted average unemployment rate of the
major European Economic Community (EEC)
countries - Belgium, Denmark, France, W.
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom - rose
steadily from 2.6 percent in 1970 to 11.5 per-
cent in1986 (Chart 1).
The difference between the U.S. and OECD
countries is more striking when employment is
considered. From 1970-1986, overall employ-
ment grew by 36 percent in the u.s. but fell by
0.6 percent in the EEC countries. Furthermore, a
greater proportion of employment growth here
has been full time. Contrary to popular impres-
sion, the current expansion has not been based
primarily on an expansion of part-time jobs. The
unemployment rate for full-time workers fell
from its peak of 10.6 p~rcent in the fourth quar-
ter of 1982 to 5.6 percent in the third quarter of
1987, while the unemployment rate for part-
time workers fell from its peak of 11.0 percent to
8.2 percent over the same time period.
By any indicator, the labor market in Europe has
performed much more poorly. This Letter
attempts to ascertain why.
Labor market rigidities
The simplest explanation, and a popular one,
attributes the employment differences to the rel-
ative rigidities of the respective labor markets.
The American economy is characterized by a
relatively more laissez faire approach in contrast
to the numerous regulations and welfare provi-
sions of the European economies. From the
employers' point of view, mandatory work bene-
fits reduce the demand for labor. In Europe,
payroll taxes amount to roughly 20 percent of
wages, as against 7 percent in the U.S. The rela-
tively greater expansion in part-time employ-
ment in Europe also is consistent with this
explanation as part-time jobs are exempt from
such legislation.
From the employees' point of view, generous
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits induce
them to be more picky about taking jobs while
remaining in the labor force. Primary benefits in
most European countries are granted more easily
than in the U.S. and last for a year or more, as
against twenty-six weeks in the U.S. For these
reasons, employment growth is likely to be
lower and the unemployment rate higher in
Europe than in the u.s.
However, European countries have had these
liberal welfare provisions since the 1950s, and
until the late 1970s have had consistently lower
unemployment rates - rarely exceeding 2-3
percent - than the U.S. During that period, the
prevailing consensus attributed the better
employment performance in Europe to the same
policies now blamed for its poorer performance.
Unemployment insurance (UI) benefits were
believed to help in stabilizing the level of
demand during a downturn in output and
employment. This view was shaped by the expe-
rience of the Great Depression during which the
unemployment rate rose, by differing estimates,
to between 20 and 25 percent, when UI was
nonexistent. These facts suggest that it is neces-
sary to look more carefully at the determinants
of the unemployment rate.
Unemployment: inflows and duration
The unemployment rate measures the percent-
age of the labor force (employed plus unem-
ployed) who, in any given survey period, report
themselves as out of work and looking for a job,
as well as workers on temporary layoff. For a
labor force of 100, if 2 workers were to enter
unemployment every month and remain unem-
ployed for three months, the unemployment rate
would be 6 percent per month. The same 6 per-
cent rate would prevail if one worker were to
enter unemployment every month and stay
unemployed for six months. Under "steadyFRBSF
state" conditions, the unemployment rate equals
the inflow into unemployment, expressed as a
percentage of the labor force, multiplied by the
average duration of unemployment.
This breakdown of the unemployment rate helps
explain why policies meant to protect workers
from layoffs can end up raising the unemploy-
ment rate. Faced with such legislation,
employers become more reluctant to hire new
workers and the average duration of unemploy-
ment rises. From the workers' side, UI benefits
allow those who are unemployed to search
longer (or to wait longer, as the case may be) for
a suitable job.
By itself, UI benefits can also raise inflows into
unemployment by making employers more
prone to layoff workers temporarily. The incen-
tive for laid off workers to await recall, as
opposed to search for and move to another job,
rises with the extent of benefits. Without such
benefits, a firm would be reluctant to resort to
temporary layoffs because it might find a part of
its experienced labor force working elsewhere
when it needs them again. For this reason, the
rate at which laid off workers are recalled by
firms rises around the time UI benefits are
exhausted.
In the U.s., this effect is mitigated by the system
of taxation since taxes on employers for the UI
fund are linked to their layoff record, and
thereby provide an incentive to reduce layoffs.
From the employees' point of view, UI does not
have a significant impact on the inflows into
unemployment because "job leavers," dis-
charges, inexperienced workers, and labor force
entrants are rarely eligible for benefits.
Eurosclerosis
In brief, UI benefits raise unemployment pri-
marily by prolonging the duration of unemploy-
ment. This is the major difference behind the
unemployment figures of the u.s. and European
economies: the latter have a much higher dura-
tion of unemployment. From 1976-1986, the
inflow into unemployment over eight weeks as a
percentage ofthe labor force averaged 1.9 per-
cent in the United Kingdom, whereas the corre-
sponding average unemployment rate was 8.8
percent. for the u.s. the inflow over five weeks
as a percentage of the labor force averaged 3.0
percent and the corresponding average unem-
ployment rate was 7.4 percent. The greater
inflow over a shorter period of time despite a
lower unemployment rate in the U.s. implies a
much lower duration of unemployment.
Furthermore, the rise in unemployment in the
U.K. has come about almost entirely through a
rise i'n duration. For males in the U.K., the
monthly inflows over the periods 1962-1966,
1967-1975, and 1975-1983 averaged 1.5, 1.6,
and 1.7 percent respectively; the corresponding
average male unemployment rates over these
periods were 2.4,3.9, and 10.6 percent respec-
tively. By contrast, the smaller rise in U.s. unem-
ployment over these periods has come about
through increases in both inflow and duration.
Prior to the 1970s, the European countries could
sustain low unemployment rates in part because
economicshocks were notvery severe. Starting
in the 1970s, oil price rises, increasing competi-
tion from Asian countries, and other structural
shocks required fundamental adjustments. Firms
could postpone, but not altogether avoid,
layoffs. Unlike in the U.S., however, laid off
workers have not been quickly absorbed into
other lower paying sectors; nor have they
returned to their original employers at much
lower real wages, as evident in recent domestic
wage contracts. Moreover, although replace-
ment rates (the ratio of UI benefits to wages)
have not changed much in recent years in
Europe, the administration of UI benefits has
become more lax.
Another factor that needs to be considered is
that the percentage of the labor force that is
unionized in most European countries is greater
than that in the U.s. From 1965-1977, on aver-
age, 35 percent of all employees in the EEC
countries were unionized, as against 28 percent
in the U.s. Some economists have attributed the
rise in European unemployment to excessively
high real wages imposed by unions. Their argu-
ment is that the unemployed (outsiders) cannot
compete directly with the employed workers
(insiders) in bidding down wages. What this
approach fails to explain is why the unemployed
do not bid down wages in the nonunionized
sector.
The Canadian connection
To assess the effect of labor market policies on
the unemployment rate, a comparison of theChart 1
























Source: DECO Standardized Unemployment Rates
* Based on data for first seven months of 1987
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u.s. with Canada is instructive. Both the u.s.
and Canada have identical methods of measur-
ing unemployment, very closely correlated busi-
ness cycles, and similar labor force participation
trends. As can be seen in Chart 2, the Canadian
unemployment rate hovered around the u.S.
unemployment rate until the late 1970s.
Although Canada's real GNP recovered after the
1982 recession at a rate consistent with the
recovery in U.S. real GNP, its unemployment
rate has remained higher. (By contrast, recent
European unemployment can partly be
attributed to contractionary fiscal and monetary
policy that has kept their real GNP growth
sluggish.)
Orley Ashenfelter and David Card have com-
pared and analyzed various features of the u.s.
and Canadian labor markets over the period
1966 to 1984. They found that effective mini-
mum wages, the proportion of the work force
covered by UI, and payroll taxes as a percentage
of employee compensation have been roughly
the same in both countries over that time period.
They then looked at three determinants of the
generosity of the UI system: replacement rates,
duration of benefits, and the fraction of the
unemployed who are UI recipients. While the
average duration of benefits has been about the
same, the net (after-tax) replacement rate is cur-
rently lower in Canada. However, they found
that, due to stricter eligibility criteria, the ratioof
UI recipients to total unemployed was IQwer in
the U.s. at an average of about30 percent
versus 90 percent in Canada overthe period
1966-1984. Although they considered the dif-
ference to be "quite remarkable," they neverthe-
less concluded that it could not explain the
recent divergence because it had existed for
about twenty years.
The greater stringency with which benefits are
now granted in the u.s. warrants more
emphasis. Due to deliberate changes in eco-
nomic policies from 1980 onwards, extended
and supplemental UI benefits that were pre-
viously available beyond 26 weeks were dras-
tically reduced. In 1975, when the total
unemployment rate was 8.5 percent,78 percent
of the unemployed received some kind of bene-
fit. In 1982, when the total unemployment rate
was 9.7 percent, only 45 percent received some
kind of UI benefits. Without the change in pol-
icy, more of the unemployed would have
received benefits in 1982 because the fraction of
unemployed workers eligible for UI rises, along
with layoffs, in accordance with the severity of
therecession.
Conclusion
The generous UI provisions of European econo-
mies seem to raise their unemployment rate by
prolonging the duration of unemployment. Laws
shielding workers from layoffs and dismissals
contribute to lower inflows into unemployment
in Europe, but also decrease the outflows by
reducing new hires and recalls. As a result, they
have hampered Europe's ability to adjust to the
economic shocks of the 1970s. The recent per-
sistence of unemployment in Canada compared
to the u.s. supports this conclusion, as it can be
traced to the much easier availability of UI ben-
efits in Canada.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 207,075 - 1,522 2,540 1.2
Loans and Leases1 6 183,125 - 1,550 - 557 - 0.3
Commercial and Industrial 50,942 - 634 491 0.9
Real estate 71,621 - 49 4,842 7.2
Loans to Individuals 36,976 - 57 - 4,291 - 10.3
Leases 5,405 - 1 - 218 - 3.8
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,763 - 132 3,867 29.9
Other Securities2 7,187 160 - 770 - 9.6
Total Deposits 209,212 2,119 - 2,599 - 1.2
Demand Deposits 54,649 2,330 - 2,903 - 5.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,120 - 1,417 - 625 - 1.7
OtherTransaction Balances4 20,096 - 272 2,240 12.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,467 61 - 1,936 - 1.4
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,091 - 287 - 2,783 - 5.9
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000 or more 31,044 - 167 - 2,795 8.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,202 - 2,708 - 6,223 - 21.8
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange